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Up to the Bar? Designing the Hybrid Khmer Rouge Tribunal in
Cambodia. By Kathleen Claussen
On July 18, 2007, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC) charged Kaing Guek Eav (known as "Duch"),
commandant of the main Khmer Rouge torture house, with crimes against
humanity and ordered his placement in provisional detention.' By December,
the Chambers had detained and charged the four other remaining leaders of
the Khmer Rouge regime, paving the way for trials the nation has awaited for
three decades. The finalization of the Internal Rules for the Chambers in June
2007 paved the way for the much-anticipated prosecutions of the Khmer
Rouge regime. However, the Internal Rules and their negotiation process have
already come under attack for acquiescing to the whims of Cambodian
authorities and failing to meet international standards.
This Recent Development analyzes the outstanding concerns and
noteworthy provisions of the Internal Rules and the structure of the ECCC,
assessing the validity of these criticisms and their consequences for the trials
ahead. I proceed by presenting an outline of the ECCC and the Internal Rules,
and conclude by identifying unsettled challenges that the institution confronts
as it gets underway. The ECCC's legal architecture represents a tenuous
fusion of international and domestic elements, illustrative of competing claims
of ownership between international and domestic actors. The administrators of
the Court are charged with engineering a workable system in which to
prosecute the aging Khmer Rouge leadership. Thus far, however, the process
of balancing the international with the domestic has only bogged down the
Chambers as it struggles to begin its work.
After many years of negotiation and political controversy over the
feasibility of such a tribunal, the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia created the ECCC in 2003 to try leaders of the Khmer Rouge
regime that caused the deaths of an estimated 1.7 million people from 1975 to
1979. The Agreement was incorporated into Cambodian law in 2004,2 though
with provisions that differed from the original. Thus, before it began its work,
I. Order of Provisional Detention, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, No.
001/18-07-2007, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/indictment/l/Order-of
Provisional Detention-DUCH-EN.pdf.
2. Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, NS/RKM/1004/006
(2004) (unofficial translation by the Council of Jurists and the Secretariat of the Task Force, revised
Aug. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Cambodian ECCC Law], available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/
english/cabinet/law/4/KRLaw as amended_27 Oct 2004_Eng.pdf. The Cambodian government
requested that the United Nations create the tribunal in 1997, but evidence of rampant corruption beyond
repair in the domestic criminal justice system and the fragility of the U.N. presence in the country
prevented progress for several years.
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the Chambers had to reconcile its domestic 3 and international 4 founding
documents. This discrepancy raised questions of how much control the United
Nations and donor states would maintain over the Chambers.
The relationship between the international actors and domestic judiciary
within the ECCC is neither a new model distinct from, nor a replication of,
earlier international tribunals, though it has drawn lessons from the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), particularly with respect to cost
efficiency and time management. 5 The ECCC's hybrid design attempts to
infuse international standards into Cambodian domestic law. The Chambers
are not situated separately from the Cambodian judiciary; rather, they sit
squarely within the existing judiciary as an ad hoc Cambodian court of
original jurisdiction. Setting up the trials this way has required a careful
legitimization of international crimes in Cambodian law, including the
spontaneous execution of past treaty obligations and ratification of
international conventions that criminalize the offenses committed by the
Khmer Rouge. The structure that has evolved uses an innovative institutional
design blending international standards into a highly flawed domestic legal
structure with the aim of pleasing both international and domestic publics. The
ECCC has, therefore, become yet another testing ground for the adjudication
of the world's most heinous crimes.
Originally, the administrators envisaged a three-year plan for the
Chambers: one year for investigation, one for trials, and one for appeals.6 The
Court began investigations in July 2006, and the judges subsequently began
the tedious process of developing the Internal Rules. After considerable delay
and trepidation, they adopted the Internal Rules in June 2007, signaling the
commencement of the prosecution phase. Since then, the work of the Court
has dramatically accelerated. Between September and November, the Court
successfully detained and charged the five primary suspects expected for
prosecution, and trials are expected to begin by mid-2008. The three-year time
horizon is still attainable, though the ECCC will likely continue beyond 2009.
The US$56.3 million budget, however, based on pledges from U.N. member
states, may not sustain the Court's operations that long. 7 In late 2007, the
ECCC was expected to appeal to donors for an estimated US$45 million in
additional funding in order for the Court to continue its work through 2010.8
3. Cambodian ECCC Law, supra note 2.
4. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea, G.A. Res. 10135, U.N. Doe. AIRES/57/228B/Annex (May 13, 2003), available
at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/agreement/5/Agreement-betweenUNandRGC.pdf. The
Agreement specifies in Article 2 that it will be implemented into Cambodian law and that any
amendments must be preceded by consultations between parties, but it is not clear by what mechanism
the U.N. will be consulted.
5. Interview with Ben Kiernan, Dir., Yale Genocide Studies Program, Yale Univ., in New
Haven, Conn. (Oct. 17, 2007).
6. Seth Mydans, Khmer Rouge to Face Trial Soon, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 17, 2006, at 4.
7. Telephone Interview with Motoo Noguchi, Int'l Judge, Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (Oct. 20, 2007).
8. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRITICAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE FUNDRAISING
DRIVE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 2 (2007), available at
http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?resid= 103943.
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In anticipation of this appeal, some nongovernmental organizations called for
prudence among donor states, urging them to examine the Court's work
carefully to ensure that transparency and accountability benchmarks are met.
They emphasized the failure of international actors to insulate the ECCC from
local corruption. Additional concerns about the quality and effectiveness of
the national criminal justice system prompted the international actors to claim
a broad mandate, instigating reforms to bring Cambodia up to international
standards.
Unlike most other criminal tribunals, the ECCC is embedded in the
courts of the country in which it sits and where the atrocities at issue took
place. Article 2 of the Cambodian ECCC Law states: "Extraordinary
Chambers shall be established in the existing court structure . . . . 9 It must
apply Cambodian domestic law, supplemented by international law for crimes
and procedures not found in Cambodian law. Adapting the innovations of the
other international or hybrid tribunals to Cambodia's civil law system posed
so much difficulty as to delay the adoption of the Internal Rules several
months in late 2006 and early 2007. This "mainly ... national affair" required
blending civil law, a remnant of French colonialism, with evolving
international law as gleaned from lessons learned at the other tribunals.1
0
The Cambodian ECCC Law provides for a Trial Chamber, composed of
three Cambodian judges and two international judges," as well as a Supreme
Court Chamber, composed of four Cambodian judges and three international
judges. 12 No other international or hybrid court has more domestic judges than
international judges. Also in contrast with similar institutions, the ECCC
founding documents do not specify term limits for judges. Rather, the Internal
Rules note that the same judges will serve for the duration of all the
proceedings. 13 This arrangement is intended to insulate the judges from
political pressures, in accordance with the U.N. Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary, 14 although some human rights organizations
have questioned whether some of the personnel were involved with politically
manipulated proceedings in the past.'
5
The ECCC introduces three unique attributes meriting discussion. First,
the Cambodian ECCC Law states that the judges "shall attempt to achieve
unanimity in their decisions. ' 6 In cases where this is not possible, a decision
by one of the Chambers requires an affirmative vote of a supermajority of the
judges-four judges in the Trial Chamber and five in the Supreme Court
Chamber. 17 No other hybrid criminal court has implemented a supermajority
9. Cambodian ECCC Law, supra note 2, art. 2 (emphasis added).
10. Erika Kinetz with Joe Cochrane, Closure for Cambodia? Thirty Years on, the Khmer
Rouge Trials Risk Collapse, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 2007, available at http://www.justiceinitiative.org/
db/resource2?resid= 103689.
11. Cambodian ECCC Law, supra note 2, art. 9.
12 Id.
13. Id. art. 12.
14. See G.A. Res. 40/32, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/32 (Nov. 29, 1985); G.A. Res. 40/146, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/bfh comp50.htm.
15. Seth Mydans, Justice in Cambodia? It Won't Come Easily, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 5,
2006, at 1.
16. Cambodian ECCC Law, supra note 2, art. 14.
17. Id.
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requirement. The supermajority requirement was created in response to
concerns from international actors that the domestic judges could control the
decision-making process without any sort of external check. A simple
majority would mean that domestic judges could effectively impose their own
decisions without any consultation with the foreign judges. Still, while the
supermajority provisions strengthen the weight of their judgments in the final
stages of the trials, they could serve to impede lesser decisions with too little
support in the regular course of business.
A second innovative feature of the new Chambers is that, at the
professional levels of administration, the Court features approximately equal
numbers of Cambodian and international staff. The founding documents
provide for a Cambodian prosecutor and an international prosecutor, serving
as equals, and the same is true for investigating judges, defense counsel, and
other positions.'
8
Third, the ECCC gives victims special rights and provides a mechanism
for them to receive compensation. According to the Internal Rules, victims
may join the proceedings as civil parties and have the power to make
appeals, 19 though they can be awarded non-financial reparations only. ° The
Internal Rules outline many protections and rights for victims without ever
defining who qualifies.
One serious omission on the part of the Chambers' designers is the
absence of a code of ethics for employees and judges. Regarding misconduct,
Rule 38 empowers judges to take action against offending lawyers, and U.N.
employees are subject to internal U.N. sanctions in cases of wrongdoing.
However, these provisions do not cover all court personnel. A code of conduct
is particularly necessary given the history of corruption in Cambodia's
criminal justice system. Concerns were heightened in September 2007 when
the Chambers received serious criticism for its personnel policies and
mismanagement of international funds. 21 Allegations of corruption and
unethical hiring practices emerged in international media and in the reports of
international organizations monitoring the tribunal.
One article referred to an internal audit revealing that the tribunal had
failed to address allegations of corruption with respect to funding from the
United Nations Development Program "being siphoned off as kickbacks."
22
The UNDP made public the results of the audit the following week,
confirming that Cambodian employees were suspected of paying part of their
salaries to superiors. Though the UNDP issued a press release welcoming a
"new recruitment and contracting process," 23 an October BBC report quoted
18. Id. arts. 5, 6 & 8. For co-defense counsel, see Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, DSS Administrative Regulations, §§ 2.1-2.2, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/
english/cabinet/files/defenceoffice/appforms/DSSAdminRegulationsEnglish.pdf.
19. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules, R. 12 (June 12, 2007),
available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/files/irs/ECCC IRsEnglish_2007_06_12.pdf.
20. Id., R. 23.
21. John Hall, Op-Ed., Yet Another UN Scandal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2007, at Al 5.
22. Id.
23. Press Release, U.N. Dev. Programme, ECCC Project Board Agrees on New Recruitment
and Contracting Procedures (Sept. 26, 2007), http://www.un.org.kh/undp/content/
index.php?option=com content&task-view&id=86&ltemid=3 1.
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the UNDP as saying that serious consideration should be given to
withdrawing U.N. suport from the project in the absence of serious reform on
the Cambodian side. In the same press release, the UNDP claimed "a code
of conduct-to be signed and followed by all staff-will be developed,"
though it lacked an estimated timeline.25 A code of conduct should extend
beyond financial wrongdoing to improper social activity, such as
fraternization among the personnel from different Chambers or professional
conflicts of interest.
The Rules Committee strived to achieve a balance between existing
domestic law and international standards related to the crimes under
investigation by the ECCC. That it struggled to please many stakeholders in
the creation of the Internal Rules is seen in the complexity of some of the
provisions. For example, a single rule, Rule 11 on the Defense Office, is over
one thousand words long. The intricate configuration it describes and the
Rule's own complicated organization (containing both redundancies and
contradictions) provoked administrators to create a separate, clarifying
document: the Administrative Regulations of the Defense Support Section.
Even so, the main area of friction was the relationship between the Chambers
and the Bar Association of the Kingdom of Cambodia (BAKC). The BAKC
demanded an exorbitant application fee from foreign lawyers wishing to
26practice at the ECCC. Since approval of the BAKC is a prerequisite of
practicing at the Chambers, this delayed the opening of the Tribunal.
Today, the Internal Rules continue to be revised. For example, the role
of the Pre-Trial Chamber expanded to take on additional interlocutory appeals
that may arise in the early stages of a case. Though the Chamber is only
convened when necessary, its workload increased by fifty percent. A standing
Rules Committee is responsible for any required redrafting and could
reconvene if additional rules were needed, though the judges will likely take
on this role themselves in the course of their decisionmaking. The Court's
founding documents instruct the judges to look to international law in the case
of lacunae in the Internal Rules, but this provision only causes more
controversy. To what international standard should the judges look? In the
absence of clear precedent from one of the international or hybrid tribunals,
what sources will be authoritative? On the other hand, this provision likewise
demonstrates credence to the evolving international criminal justice system. It
promotes the development of transnational customary law for more than just
the most heinous offenses.
One aspect of the Internal Rules that exemplifies the difference of
opinion between the international and the domestic actors is the definition of
the crimes. The International Criminal Court's "Elements of Crimes"
24. Guy De Launey, UN Warning on Cambodia Tribunal, BBC NEWS, Oct. 2, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7023303.stm.
25. See Press Release, U.N. Dev. Programme, supra note 23.
26. Seth Mydans, Cambodia Takes a Tiny but Crucial Step to Trial, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May
2, 2007, at 1.
2008)
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 33:253
document clearly defines "genocide," "crimes against humanity," and "war
crimes"; similar definitions can be found in relevant international conventions
on related topics. But the particular method and nature of the acts and policies
carried out by the Khmer Rouge may not fall neatly into existing categories
within international law. The Chambers rendered charges of "crimes against
humanity" and "war crimes" in the cases of the five former leaders charged by
the ECCC. Notably, they have not been charged with genocide. The
indiscriminate policies applied by the Khmer Rouge in their extermination
campaign may not meet the threshold for "genocide," leading some genocide
experts to call for a broader definition of "genocide." This presents an
opportunity for the ECCC to modify the substance of international criminal
law. Rather than confine itself to the boundaries of international legal norms
defined by other tribunals, the ECCC could expand the notion of "genocide"
to encompass the atrocities committed in Cambodia despite their
nonconformity to former models of atrocity. The limitations of the
international scheme should not render the judicial system powerless to fully
prosecute perpetrators of such violent acts.
Although the finalization of the Internal Rules and the detention of the
remaining Khmer Rouge leaders are good first steps, the judges and
administrators now have the reins and must steer the Chambers down a stable
and manageable path. If they succeed, the ECCC may serve as a model for
future hybrid innovations that draw upon international mechanisms in order to
improve domestic systems. It can demonstrate the power of international law
to effect domestic reform. Moreover, the Chambers's model confirms the
importance of designing ad hoc tribunals that are appropriate to the context in
which they must operate. First, however, the gaps and ambiguities in the
Internal Rules must be amended in order for the proceedings to run smoothly
and be considered legitimate. Uncertainty over the distribution of
responsibilities between international and domestic actors leads to larger
questions about the audience for the court: who is this court for? Efforts to fit
the Chambers into the domestic legal culture may require stepping outside the
bounds of traditional transnational legal norms. This may meet the demands of
the Cambodian people, but will it suit the international community that holds
the ECCC's purse strings?
The limited justice the Chambers provides is less than satisfactory to
many. Like the other tribunals, lower level perpetrators will never be brought
to court. As one judge put it: "You may know who killed your father or sister
and still see that person walking around. They will not be prosecuted, so that
is a limitation [of the ECCC] .... [B]ut it's better than nothing." 27
27. Interview with Motoo Noguchi, supra note 7.
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Holstering the Hired Guns: New Accountability Measures for Private
Security Contractors. By Jonathan Finer
I. Introduction
On September 16, 2007, a team of security contractors from Blackwater
Worldwide shot dead seventeen Iraqi civilians while escorting American
diplomats through central Baghdad. The fallout was swift and far-reaching.
Iraq demanded that Blackwater cease operating in the country. Its parliament
introduced legislation to revoke the blanket immunity granted to contractors in
the early days of the war by the American administrators who governed Iraq.
Within a week, family members of the victims had filed a lawsuit in U.S.
court, the FBI had launched an investigation and warned of criminal charges,
and the House Government Reform Committee had issued a withering report
on security contractors' transgressions.
Soon after the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, military commanders,
academics, and Iraqi officials have warned of insufficient oversight and
accountability for the private contractors operating there. Deployed in
unprecedented numbers, contractors have been implicated in a range of
alleged crimes and human rights violations. So far, however, not a single
contractor has been successfully prosecuted for violence perpetrated in Iraq.
Furthermore, no contractor or company has been held liable for torts
committed there. Attempts at self-regulation by the industry have also proven
ineffective. 1
Recent months have seen wide-ranging attempts to bring accountability
to the industry. This Recent Development will explain these efforts, which
include legislative initiatives, criminal charges against individual contractors,
and attempts by private litigants to secure judgments for money damages.
Because of the enormous body of literature on the topic of private military
contractors, the analysis will focus narrowly on the issue raised by the
September shootings-the various punishments and remedies available under
both civilian and military law for harms done by American contractors to Iraqi
civilians.:
II. Contractors at War
"Soldiers of fortune" have accompanied American troops on the
battlefield in every major conflict since the Revolutionary War. In the War of
1812, "privateers"-ships under contract with the U.S. government-sunk
2,500 British naval vessels and far outnumbered the fledgling American
navy. 3 The industry expanded rapidly at the close of the Cold War, as many
Western nations scaled back their militaries in the absence of an obvious
foreign threat. While in Vietnam there was roughly one contractor for every
1. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT (Int'l Peace Operations Ass'n 2001) (amended 2005),
available at http://ipoaonline.org/en/standards/pdf conduct.pdf. No substantial sanctions have ever been
handed down under these guidelines.
2. This analysis does not address, among other topics, the important issue of foreign-born
security contractors or those who are not employed by the U.S. government.
3. Alexander Tabarrok, The Rise, Fall, and Rise Again of Privateers, II INDEP. REV. 565,
571 (2007).
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five hundred soldiers, in the 1991 Gulf War, that ratio jumped to one for every
fifty uniformed troops. 4 Amid the post-9/1 1 expansion of American operations
overseas, private security companies have enabled an overstretched American
military to wage simultaneous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and maintain
force commitments elsewhere in the world. In doing so, they have taken on a
range of roles-from preparing meals to guarding convoys-once filled by
uniformed service members. In the current Iraq War, there are more
contractors serving in theater than American service members. 5
Of the estimated 180,000 contractors serving in Iraq, up to thirty
thousand are so-called "security contractors," who carry guns and perform
quasi-military roles. Contractors are immune from prosecution in Iraqi courts
under Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17,6 passed in the early days after
the war when U.S. administrators were governing the country and still in force
today. As a result, many egregious incidents have gone unpunished,
including a videotape posted on the Internet by former employees of Aegis, a
British security firm, which depicted security contractors riddling Iraqi
civilian vehicles with gunfire. In December 2006, a drunken Blackwater
employee shot and killed the bodyguard of a prominent Iraqi politician inside
Baghdad's Green Zone. Within twenty-four hours, U.S. Embassy officials had
whisked the shooter out of the country. No charges were filed in either
incident.
III. An Evolving Legal Regime
In explaining the paucity of prosecutions, scholars, military and political
officials, and the security companies themselves have long maintained that
security contractors operate outside the bounds of an effective legal regime.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Congress in October 2007 that a
"hole" in U.S. law has allowed contractors to operate with impunity. 8
International law has provided little guidance, since security contractors do
not fit neatly into definitional categories banned under the United Nations
International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries. 9
Because of recent changes, however, American military and civilian law
provide promising avenues through which contract employees, and their
employers, can be held accountable. Civilian and military legal regimes offer
4. Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with
Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233, 235 (2000).
5. T. Christian Miller, Contractors Outnumber Troops in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2007, at
Al.
6. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), Status of the Coalition Provisional
Authority, MNF-Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, CPA/ORD/27 June 2004/17 (June 27,
2004), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD 17_Status of
Coalition _Rev with Annex A.pdf.
7. See also Human Rights Watch, US: Close Legal Loopholes Allowing Contractors to Act
with Impunity, HUM. RTS. NEWS, Oct. 2, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/10/02/usintl7002.htm
(stating that at least seventeen cases of detainee abuse have been referred to federal prosecutors).
8. John M. Broder, Rice Says "Hole " in U.S. Law Shields Contractors in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 2007, at A6.
9. Under this law, mercenaries cannot be natives of a party to the conflict. International
Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, G.A. Res. 44/34,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 72d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989).
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two kinds of accountability mechanisms: retributive accountability, which
punishes contractors; and compensatory accountability, which provides
financial remedies for those harmed by the contractors' actions.
Military Law Civilian Law
Retributive Uniform Code of Military Extraterritorial
Military Justice Jurisdiction Act




A. Retributive Justice: UCMJ
Civilians accompanying military forces have been tried in military
courts since at least the time of the American Revolution.' 0 Prior to the 1950
enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 11 military
prosecution of civilians was well-established under the Articles of War, which
codified military law in the early days of the American republic. Civilians
were tried under this system during both World Wars.
The advent of the UCMJ allowed for the court-martialing of civilian
persons serving with or accompanying the military in the field "in a time of
war."' 2 This provision, however, was significantly limited through a series of
Supreme Court cases. In Reid v. Covert, the Court held that the wife of a
service member could not be tried for capital crimes in a military court during
peacetime.13 That principle was soon extended to non-capital cases' 4 and to
civilian employees of the military in both capital
15 and non-capital cases. 16
What some saw as the death knell for military jurisdiction over civilians came
in the military appellate court decision, United States v. Averette, in which a
Vietnam-era contractor was convicted of stealing shipments of batteries from
a military base. Because Congress never declared war on Vietnam, the court
reasoned, military courts had no jurisdiction over the defendant.' 7 No civilians
have been court-martialed since.
Late last year, however, Congress expanded military jurisdiction over
civilians. The 2007 defense authorization bill amended the Uniform Code of
Military Justice to cover civilians accompanying military forces in both
declared wars and "contingency operations"-official parlance for undeclared
wars like Iraq and Afghanistan. As the Army explained in its 2007 annual
guide to the UCMJ, the full impact of this change has not yet been
determined: "Subjecting contractor personnel to the UCMJ during all
contingency operations appears to constitute a significant change rather than a
10. See FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE 22-23 (1967).
11. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (2006).
12. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10)-(12) (2006).
13. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
14. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960)
15. Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
16. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960)
17. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970).
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clarification. No legislative history explains this change. Further, as there is no
published guidance, it is unclear how this change will be implemented and
precisely what the ramifications will be."' So far, no guidelines have been
issued to military prosecutors, however, and no cases have been brought under
this new provision.
Even if military prosecutors bring charges under the new provision, the
expansion of the UCMJ will only apply to Defense Department contractors,
leaving many contractors operating in Iraq-including the State Department's
Blackwater guards-uncovered. In addition, because it applies only to
contractors involved in a declared war or contingency operation, contractors
serving in humanitarian or economic development operations may be exempt.
There will also likely be a host of constitutional objections raised to this
provision. Since military law provides neither the Fifth Amendment right to
indictment by grand jury nor the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury
(among other protections19) the constitutionality of applying it to American
civilians remains in doubt. In addition, the UCMJ amendment is over-
inclusive, because it does not differentiate among the various categories of
civilians who might be accompanying military forces, such as contractors and
embedded journalists. Nor does it distinguish among the various provisions of
the UCMJ, meaning military regulations about sexual orientation or
disparaging the commander-in-chief could in theory be applied to civilians.
The new provision should be narrowed with a stricter definition of who is
covered and should include a clause indicating that only crimes that have a
parallel in civilian law should be prosecuted.
B. Compensatory Justice: Foreign Claims Act
Military units are authorized to compensate victims of crimes committed
by contractors under the Foreign Claims Act,2° which was passed during the
Second World War. While military commanders routinely make informal
"condolence payments" when soldiers accidentally kill or wound a civilian,
these payments are generally small ($2,500 or less) and include no admission
of wrongdoing. Payments under the Foreign Claims Act, on the other hand,
can be up to one hundred thousand dollars, but require a decision by an
adjudicative body called a Foreign Claims Commission that a wrong was
done-the minimum standard is negligence. The Act exempts those killed or
wounded "in combat," and their families or dependents, from receiving
compensation.
While the Act currently covers "civilian employee[s] of the military
department concerned," on its face it does not reach civilian contractors, who
work for private companies and are, at most, only indirectly employed by the
government. In October, the military released a slew of documents describing
claims filed by Iraqi civilians whose relatives were killed or whose property
18. Mark A. Ries, Contractors Accompanying the Force, ARMY LAW., Jan. 2007, at 161,
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/0 1-2007.pdf.
19. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-26 (2006) (composition of courts
martial).
20. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2734-36 (2006).
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was damaged.2' In all, the Army has paid out at least thirty-two million dollars
in Iraq and Afghanistan. 22 But only one of the cases described is a killing by a
security contractor. The claim is listed as "denied, because the contractors are
not governmental employees. 2 a
The Foreign Claims Act should be amended to allow the military to
make payments to victims of contractors' violence. Clauses could be included
in contracts that would require security companies to reimburse the military
for any payments. There is reason to believe that the military would willingly
adhere to such a system. Commanders on the ground in Iraq often complain
that contractors turn local populations against the military by committing
crimes that are then blamed on soldiers.
V. Civilian Law
A. Retributive Justice: MEJA
Between 1970, when Averette was decided, and 2000, there was no
civilian corollary to using the military justice system to try civilian contractors• • 24
who commit crimes, meaning contractors fell into what one commentator
has described as a legal "Bermuda Triangle." 25 In 2000, however, Congress
passed the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA),26 which created
jurisdiction for federal prosecutors to bring cases against Defense Department
contractors and employees in U.S. federal courts. MEJA was expanded in
2005 to include contractors with any _government agency "supporting the
mission of the Department of Defense.
Even as expanded, however, MEJA has been largely impotent, leading
to only a handful of prosecutions and no convictions related to crimes
committed in Iraq or Afghanistan. It is difficult for American prosecutors to
gather evidence overseas, particularly in war zones. And the fact that MEJA
can only be used to prosecute felonies considerably narrows the range of
potential cases. Congress is seeking to amend MEJA again to end the
exemption for contractors who are arguably not "supporting" the Pentagon,
such as those involved in reconstruction. The MEJA Expansion and
Enforcement Act of 2007 passed the House of Representatives on October 4,
2007. It would expand MEJA to cover all contractors "[within] an area, or in
close proximity to an area (as designated by the Department of Defense),
where the Armed Forces is conducting a contingency operation.,2 8 It also calls
21. The documents are available at American Civil Liberties Union, Documents Received
From the Department of the Army in Response to ACLU Freedom of Information Act Request (released
on Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/natsec/foia/log.html.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. An exception is the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States, 18
U.S.C. § 7 (2006), under which civilians can be prosecuted for crimes committed on military bases.
25. Nonna Gorilovskaya, Contracting Justice, MOTHER JONES, June 11, 2004, available at
http://www.mojones.com/news/dailymojo/2004/06/06_513.html.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2006).
27. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
364, 120 Stat. 2084.
28. Id.
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for the establishment of FBI "theater investigative units," whose sole purpose
would be to develop cases against contractors.
29
MEJA will soon be tested by a pair of cases at different stages of
adjudication. On February 15, 2007, contractor Aaron Langston stabbed to
death a female colleague on a military base north of Baghdad. In March 2007,
a federal prosecutor in Arizona secured an indictment under MEJA.
Separately, at the time of writing, the FBI was conducting an investigation
into the September 16, 2007 Blackwater shootings and had concluded
preliminarily that the shootings were unprovoked, contradicting Blackwater's
claim that the guards had responded to hostile fire. A grand jury was
reportedly convened in November to hear testimony and consider indictments
under MEJA.
Even if it passes, however, MEJA expansion will not be a panacea. Its
failings stem not just from loopholes, but from a simple lack of political will
to bring cases. Prosecutions are hampered by the difficulties inherent in
conducting investigations in war zones given language barriers and the
security climate, particularly for civilian investigators. Furthermore,
prosecuting contractors under MEJA poses numerous evidentiary hurdles.
Iraqi witnesses may not be willing to travel to the United States to testify or be
able to obtain the requisite visas needed to do so in a timely manner.
B. Compensatory Justice: Tort Claims
It has proven very difficult to bring tort cases against contractors for
their actions in Iraq. The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which was enacted as part
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, creates jurisdiction for foreigners to claims for
torts "committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.,,30 It lay virtually untested and dormant until revived by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1980 in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.3 1 But the
Act's applicability has been considerably narrowed in a series of lawsuits
against corporations. Among the judicially created defenses that have proven
to be major barriers are the combatant activities defense, which exempts from
liability actions taken during combat, and the government contractor defense,
which grants immunity to government contractors from state tort claims.
Iraqi civilians have brought prominent tort cases against two U.S.
contractors involved in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal: Titan Corporation (a
translation firm) and CACI International (which handled some
interrogations).32 The ATS claims against both defendants were dismissed last
year and, in November, the judge dismissed the state law tort claims against
Titan because of the high degree of military oversight and control over its
employees. The state law claims against CACI were allowed to proceed. The
trial will begin in the coming months. Another tort case was brought in
September, soon after the Blackwater shootings, by family members of the
victims. The case makes both ATS claims for extrajudicial killing and war
29. Id.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
31. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
32. Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F.
Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2006).
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crimes and common law claims for assault and battery, wrongful death,
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring
and supervision of employees.
33
As in the earlier cases, major challenges include doctrinal hurdles such
as the combatant activities and government contractor defenses and the
evidentiary hurdles discussed earlier, which give rise to claims of forum non
conveniens.
VI. Conclusion
It remains to be determined whether any of these attempts will prove
effective. Many questions remain. Whether contractors are retributively
punished will depend on political and prosecutorial discretion and the
difficulties inherent in bringing legal actions based on events that take place in
a war zone. Will military lawyers be willing to test the amended UCMJ by
bringing cases against contractors? Will military judges, or the Supreme
Court, uphold the amendment in the face of constitutional challenges? Will
Congress pass the proposed legislation strengthening MEJA, and will federal
prosecutors use it? As for compensatory justice, the Foreign Claims Act
should be definitively expanded to allow for claims made against contractors,
and such payments should be issued with greater frequency. The ATS and
common law tort cases yet to be decided will go a long way toward
determining the viability of future suits.
Even if none of these measures proves effective, the Baghdad
government appears to have lost patience with the immunity arrangement that
has allowed contractors to avoid legal entanglement there. Contractors have
suggested that even without immunity they will continue to work in Iraq.35
But given the country's troubled and arbitrary legal system, 36 they may be
better off if the accountability regime described above has teeth.
33. Atban v. Blackwater USA, No. 1:07-cv-01831 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.burkepyle.comBWComplaintOct I .pdf.
34. At the time of this writing, the Pentagon and State Department reportedly agreed on new
guidelines for how security contractors should operate in the field. The guidelines call for military
commanders to be given more control over contractors, and for cameras to be mounted in contractors'
vehicles. See, e.g., New Rules for Iraq Security Firms, BBC NEWS, Dec. 6, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/americas/7130147.stm.
35. Christian Berthelsen, Security Crews Ponder Future in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2007, at
A14.
36. See, e.g., Michael Moss, Iraq's Legal System Staggers Beneath the Weight of War, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, at Al.
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No Right to Fight: The Modern Implications of Japan's Pacifist Postwar
Constitution. By Zachary D. Kaufman*
I. Introduction
Allowing Japan to rearm "is like giving chocolate liqueur to an
alcoholic." So said former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. I
Japan, a global leader in many fields, has since World War II lagged in at least
one: offensive military capabilities. Japan's apparent rearmament, perhaps
inevitable, would violate the country's pacifist postwar constitution and
prompt concerns among its neighbors and around the globe, especially at a
time in which Japan is increasingly nationalistic and revisionist. As it
remilitarizes to secure its future, Japan must confront its past. If it does not
fully and sincerely address the wartime atrocities it perpetrated, Japan may
ultimately find itself facing an increasingly suspicious and hostile
environment.
II. Background and Recent Developments
Since World War II, Japan has been constitutionally barred from
maintaining an offensive military. U.S. government officials drafted the
2Japanese Constitution, which came into effect on May 3, 1947. Article 9,
entitled "Renunciation of War," states in full:
1. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as means of settling international disputes.
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces,
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The nght of belligerency of
the state will not be recognized.
3
Since the end of the U.S. occupation, however, Japan has gradually
taken steps to strengthen-and flex-its military muscle. In 1990, Japan
announced that it would provide a substantial financial package to assist
Allied forces in the first Gulf War.4 Two years later, Japan passed legislation
to permit Japanese soldiers to join U.N. peacekeeping operations. Since
September 11, 2001, Japan has enacted various laws to circumvent Article 9
and participate in the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.5
In 2003, Japan launched its first spy satellites and declared that it would
install a "purely defensive" U.S.-made missile shield.6 Three years later, the
* The author wishes to thank the following individuals for comments on an earlier draft of
this piece: Ligia Abreu, Fahim Ahmed, Adrienne Bernhard, Phil Clark, Kathleen Claussen, Jon Finer,
Scott Grinsell, Caitlin Hall, Peter Harrell, Howard Kaufman, Vivek Krishnamurthy, and Vipin Narang.
I. Peter J. Katzenstein & Martin Rouse, Japan as a Regional Power in Asia, in JAPAN AND
SOUTH EAST ASIA 193, 222 (WolfMendl ed., 2001).
, 2. John M. Maki, The Japanese Constitutional Style, in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS
FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-67, at 3, 8-9 (Dan Fenno Henderson ed., 1968).
3. KENPO [Constitution], art. 9 (Japan).
4. HUGO DOBSON, JAPAN AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 64 (2003).
5 Norimitsu Onishi, Premier's Sudden Resignation Leaves Japan in Disarray, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2007, at A3.
6. James Brooke, Japan Launches Spy Satellite Despite North Korean Threats, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 2003, at AIO; Timeline: Japan, BBC NEWS, Sept. 12, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1 261918.stm.
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Diet, Japan's parliament, approved the creation of the country's first full-
fledged defense ministry since World War 11. 7 By 2007, Japan was spending
US$41.75 billion annually on its military, the sixth most of any country in the
world.8
Beyond merely extending its military capabilities, postwar Japan has
also been more willing to use them. In 1992, in its first foreign deployment of
troops since the end of World War II, Japan sent approximately 1,200 non-
combat soldiers to Cambodia as part of a U.N. peacekeeping mission. In 2001,
for the first time since World War II, Japan sank a foreign vessel when an
unidentified and unresponsive North Korean spy ship approached Japan. In
another move unprecedented since World War II, Japan deployed forces to a
combat zone when it sent "non-combat" soldiers to Iraq in 2004. Additionally,
to assist with the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, from 2001 to 2007, Japan
provided fuel to U.S., U.K., and allied ships operating in the Indian Ocean.
Notwithstanding the fact that most opinion polls indicate that Japanese
citizens oppose remilitarization, 9 official Japanese rhetoric has become
increasingly militaristic in recent years. Japan's "three non-nuclear
principles," outlined in 1967 by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato-and which
earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974-prohibit Japan from possessing,
developing, or introducing nuclear weapons on its territory. However,
several senior Japanese officials, including recent and current prime ministers
Shinzo Abe and Yasuo Fukuda, respectively, declared in 2002 that, despite
Article 9, Japan could possess nuclear weapons. ' The following year,
Japanese Foreign Minister Shigeru Ishiba advocated Japan's right in principle
to attack preemptively. 12 Since then, senior Japanese officials have not
publicly disavowed these claims.
III. Word Games
In the face of this mounting evidence of its remilitarization, Japan
engages in semantic contortions to downplay its milita 73 capabilities and
activities. Japan calls its military "Self-Defense Forces" and justifies its
growing capabilities as strictly defensive. While it acknowledges that in recent
years it has "purchased a great deal of military equipment from the U.S.,
including more than 200 F-15 fighters, more than 100 P3C Orion patrol
planes, 4 AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] surveillance
7. Timeline Japan, supra note 6.
8. Global Security, World Wide Military Expenditures, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/spending.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2007).
9. Joshua Kurlantzick, Rising Sun, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 24, 2005, at 12.
10. Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan, Nobel Lecture: The Pursuit of Peace and Japan in
the Nuclear Age (Dec. 11, 1974), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/peace/
laureates/1 974/sato-lecture.html.
I 1. Non-Nuclear Principles to Be Reviewed, CHUGOKU SHIMBUN PEACE NEWS, June 2, 2002,
http://www.chugoku-np.co.jp/abom/02e/AnO2060202.html.
12. David McNeill, Japan Warns That It Will Attack if North Korea Aims Missile, INDEP.
(London), Sept. 15, 2003, at 11.
13. See generally THE MODERN JAPANESE MILITARY SYSTEM (James H. Buck ed., 1975)
(discussing the history, characteristics, and domestic and foreign relations of the Japanese Self-Defense
Forces).
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aircraft, and 4 Aegis ships," 14 at the same time, Japan claims not to "possess
capabilities for projecting offensive power," reasoning that it "has no aircraft
carriers, no ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], no long-range
bombers, and no marines."' 5 As one commentator observed:
Article 9 has been so diluted by doublespeak as to become virtually meaningless. An
early strike against Korea, Ishiba explains, would be "defensive", not "pre-emptive."
Likewise, in May 2002, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe declared that Japan
could have nuclear weapons so long as they were "small." In fact, he added, "in legal
theory Japan could have intercontinental ballistic missiles and atomic bombs."'
6
However, Japan's capabilities-and their use-can be viewed
differently. Soldiers are not necessarily or always "non-combat"; a missile
shield may not be "purely defensive"; and even a small nuclear weapon is still
a nuclear weapon. Military troops and technologies often have dual usage as
defensive and offensive weapons.
Critics further assert that Japan's recent involvement in the Middle East
cannot be characterized as self-defensive or even humanitarian. 17 Even
financially supporting or contributing troops to U.N. peacekeeping missions,
as Japan did in Cambodia, may be illegal according to Article 9, if such
actions are not in Japan's self-defense. States have claimed significant latitude
under the banner of "self-defense." As critics argued when the United States
invaded Iraq in 2003, preemptive self-defense may be nothing more than
thinly veiled-and miscalculated-aggression. For example, some argue that,
because Japan has limited natural resources, "[t]he protection of Japan's oil
supply could be incorporated easily within the definition of self-defence,"'
' 8
which could justify military action in oil-rich states. Those wary of Japan
rearming are especially sensitive to Japan's understanding and use of the term,
as "self-defense" is a Justification apologists of Japanese wartime aggression
offered-and still do. 1
IV. Rationale
Why the trend towards remilitarization? American pressure offers a
partial explanation: by not seeking to enforce the dictates of Japan's pacifist
constitution, the U.S. government has implicitly signaled to Japan that the
country can, and perhaps should, rearm. Almost immediately, the United
States started to view Japan as critical to defending the United States's
14. Ryozo Kato, Japanese Ambassador to the U.S., Japan's Role in a Changing World (June
13, 2006), http://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/jicc/EJN-vol2_no9.htm.
15. Id.
16. Alex Kerr, A War- Tom Land, TIME, Feb. 17, 2003, at 22.
17. Norimitsu Onishi, Premier 1l, Japanese Party Delays Vote on Successor, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2007, at AI2.
18. DOBSON, supra note 4, at 70.
19. See, e.g., Howard W. French, Specter of a Rearmed Japan Stirs Its Wartime Generation,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2001, at Al; Shane Green, Japan's Lack of Remorse Troubling as It Manoeuvres
to Rearm, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 19, 2003, available at http://www.smh.com.au/
articles/2003/06/18/1055828382201.html; Paul Wiseman, Nationalism Gains Strength in Japan, USA
TODAY, July 26, 2007, at 6A.
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postwar interests in Asia, and particularly in combating communism. 20 As
soon as 1947, the United States began encouraging Japan to rearm. Recently,
especially after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the United States has
counted on Japan as one of its few reliable military allies.
U.S. encouragement to rearm occurs at a time when Japan is
increasingly concerned about its neighbors and feels it must bolster its
military to ensure its security. In 1998, North Korea fired a Taepodong-l
missile over Japan, and has since test-fired seven more long-range missiles.
Four years later, North Korea declared that it already possessed and was
continuing to develop nuclear weapons, and claimed to have performed its
first successful nuclear weapons test in 2006. In 2003, North Korea
announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
China has also appeared threatening to Japan. In recent years, Chinese
submarines and aircraft have repeatedly entered Japanese sea and air spaces,
and Chinese civilians have staged sometimes violent anti-Japanese protests,
perhaps conducted with official Chinese sanction. In response to perceived
Chinese and North Korean military buildup and aggression, Japanese
nationalism and public support for rearming and revising the constitution to
22eliminate pacifism have grown, as has support for Japanese politicians who
advocate these policies. 
2 3
Japan is also concerned with threats emanating from non-state actors. In
1995, Aum Shinrikyo, a religious sect, released sarin-a deadly nerve gas-in
Tokyo's subway, killing twelve people and injuring thousands. The events of
September 11, 2001, then prompted Japan to declare its interest in combating
global terrorism. In a 2007 policy speech, Fukuda cited "the proliferation of
terrorists" as one reason Japan must engage more with the international
24
community.
While Japan grows increasingly distrustful of the rest of the world, the
Japanese have mixed feelings about exclusive strategic reliance on the U.S.
security umbrella. In 1995, after American soldiers stationed on Okinawa
raped a local schoolgirl, many Japanese demanded the withdrawal of U.S.
troops from the island. Then, in 2001, a U.S. submarine collided with a
Japanese training vessel, sinking the latter ship and resulting in the loss of
nine Japanese, an event that prompted some Japanese to further question their
20. E. Asian Curriculum Project, Columbia Univ., Essay: An Overview of Japan's Postwar
Defense Policy, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/japan/japanworkbook/fpdefense/artnine.htm [hereinafter
Japan Essay].
21. Kerr, supra note 16. See also Martin E. Weinstein, The Evolution of the Japan Self-
Defense Forces, in THE MODERN JAPANESE MILITARY SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 41, 43 (noting that in a
1951 meeting between Japan and the United States, Special Ambassador John Foster Dulles "insisted
that a mutual defense agreement would be possible only if Japan rearmed to the level where it could
assume primary responsibility for defending itself against a direct Soviet attack and could assist
militarily in protecting regional security" and "[h]e urged rapid expansion of the National Policy
Reserve into a 350,000-man army").
22. Wiseman, supra note 19.
23. Shane Green, Call to Rearm Japan Against Korea, THE AGE (Melbourne), Mar. 26, 2003,
available at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/03/25/l048354595324.html; Kurlantzick, supra
note 9.
24. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, Policy Speech by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda
to the 168th Session of the Diet (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
hukudaspeech/2007/ 10/01 syosin e.html [hereinafter Fukuda Speech].
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country's close military ties with the United States. By 2007, many Japanese
felt that Japan had become too associated with the U.S. military. 2 Upon
assuming office, Fukuda acknowledged that "[t]he Japan-U.S. alliance is the
cornerstone of Japan's diplomacy," while simultaneously promoting "the
principle of self-reliance" for Japan.
26
Increased threats from its neighbors and encouragement from the United
States to become more independent coincide with Japan's desire for an
increased role in international affairs, including security issues. In 2004, Japan
began actively campaigning for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security
Council, 27 an effort continued by Japan's current administration, which has
declared that "Japan will realize its responsibilities commensurate with its
national strength in the international community, and become a country which
is relied upon internationally., 28 Some senior U.S. officials, such as former
ambassador to Japan Howard Baker, support Japan's ambitions for a
permanent, veto-wielding seat on the Security Council.
29
V. Evaluation
Views on Japan's rearmament are mixed. Some believe that it is a
"healthy development," one pursued "wisely." 30 As another commentator has
argued, "the U.S. security guarantee prevents Japan from acting like a self-
sufficient country. Consequently, U.S. long-term policy should be to withdraw
from the role of Japan's protector wherever possible to encourage Japan to act
more like a leader internationally."
31
Others are more critical of Japan's remilitarization. Lee, the former
Singaporean leader, for instance, believes that if Japan were permitted to
remilitarize, it could not help but be aggressive. Still others are especially
concerned about "the advent of a nuclear-armed Japan," which, they argue,





A third view holds that, whether for good or ill, Japan's military growth
may simply be inevitable, a parallel to Japan's postwar growth in technology
and business. A recent New York Times editorial observed that "Japan is the
world's second-largest economic power, and nobody should expect it to
remain aloof to matters involving its own defense." 33 To be sure, Japan faces
legitimate threats, especially from North Korea. And even if Japan did not
seek to balance against such threats, as some international relations theorists
suggest states do, the country would likely still seek to balance against the
25. Onishi, supra note 5.
26. Fukuda Speech, supra note 24.
27. Timeline: Japan, supra note 6.
28. Fukuda Speech, supra note 24.
29. Kurlantzick, supra note 9.
30. Editorial, Japan Discovers Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1999, at A 16.
31. Chris Ajemian, Comment, The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines Under the Japanese
Constitution and Their Implications for U.S. Policy, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 323, 323 (1998).
32. Kurt M. Campbell & Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable, in THE
NUCLEAR TIPPING POINT: WHY STATES RECONSIDER THEIR NUCLEAR CHOICES 218, 219 (Kurt M.
Campbell et al. eds., 2004).
33. Japan Discovers Defense, supra note 30.
34. See, e.g, STEPHEN M. WALT, THE ORIGINS OF ALLIANCES (1987).
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growing power of state and non-state actors, as other international relations
theorists contend. 3
A final group also accepts Japan's remilitarization, but believes it has
already occurred. One commentator argues, "[t]he debate over whether Japan
should rearm is moot: Japan has long since rearmed and is capable of striking
far beyond its borders. Indeed, Japan has enough plutonium and the
technology to produce nuclear weapons in a matter of months."
36
VI. Consequences
Japan's full and unambiguous remilitarization would have significant
consequences for itself, its neighbors, and its closest military ally, the United
States. For Japan, remilitarizing could alienate Japan's former victims or
current competitors. As Francis Fukuyama argues, "Japan's unilateral revision
of Article 9, viewed against the backdrop of its new nationalism, would isolate
Japan from virtually the whole of Asia." 37 Such a scenario might prompt an
arms race between Japan and China or North Korea.
Nonetheless, some believe that, even with a constitutional revision,
Japan would remain peaceful since "no country could fail to leam its lesson
after such a horrible war., 38 But it is precisely Japan's perceived lack of
learning that so concerns domestic and foreign critics of its remilitarization.
Nationalist Japanese authorities have revised schoolbooks in order to
exonerate Japan for its guilt over aggression and atrocities in World War 11.
39
Japanese teachers claim to have been punished for discussing taboo topics
such as the "comfort women" or for refusing to participate in nationalistic
demonstrations, such as saluting the flag or standing for the national anthem.
40
Several recent official visits to Japanese shrines that glorify the country's war
dead have angered China and Korea, which suffered Japanese wartime
41atrocities. And Japan continues to resist officially acknowledging the
42
atrocities it perpetrated in its horrific past. As one commentator observed,
"because of this omission, Japan lives in dread of its neighbors' disgust and
misunderstanding.,
43
Precisely because the United States, Japan's closest military ally,
provides a nuclear umbrella, the United States, more than most countries,
could experience both benefits and drawbacks from a rearmed Japan. A Japan
more capable of defending itself and projecting its power would reduce or
even relieve the U.S. burden to safeguard its ally and would provide the
United States with a more able partner in promoting international security. 44
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41. French, supra note 19. See also Green, supra note 19.
42. See, e.g., Editorial, No Comfort, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at A20; Norimitsu Onishi,
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43. Ajemian, supra note 31, at 349.
44. See Japan Essay, supra note 20 ("As Japan's economy continues to grow and its
manufactured exports compete with and sometimes take markets away from American industries, many
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Japan's increased involvement in U.S. military ventures would bolster the
credibility of American claims of multilateralism.
On the other hand, a less dependent Japan might mean a less trusted ally.
A Japan not shielded under the U.S. nuclear umbrella might become a greater
critic of, or even threat to, U.S. strategic interests. At the same time, a United
States less reliant on Japan for its loyalty and assistance might be more willing
to criticize Japan. After all, Fukuyama suspects that the United States's
"gratitude for Japanese support in Iraq" caused the United States to refrain
from discussing Japan's nationalistic trend.45
Rearmament would also have consequences for U.S. relations with
Japan's neighbors, especially if it appears that Japan rearmed with or because
of U.S. support. William 0. Beeman, a professor of Japanese anthropology,
argues that, because of states like Korea, where "memories of Japanese
military atrocities in World War II are still alive," the United States, "in
encouraging Japan's increased military action, may think it has helped some
short-term problems. But it may have bought a great deal of trouble down the
line.",46 And such long-term consequences might include a shifting of regional
alliances that would harm U.S. interests. One commentator hypothesizes that
the United States "could find itself and Tokyo ostracized by vital allies like
Korea and Thailand, moving it even further from China. 47
VII. Conclusion
Japan now has two main options: It can continue as it has, employing
linguistic gymnastics to claim that it technically complies with its pacifist
constitution, or it can amend its constitution to reflect what many believe is
already a reality-that the previously defanged island country has been
rearming for years and will continue to do so. A third option-that Japan
reverse its rearming trend and thus comply with Article 9-seems unlikely.
If Japan does continue to rearm, it remains to be seen how far it will go.
Japan's remilitarization was "unthinkable" after World War II. Because Japan
remains the only country ever to suffer an atomic bombing, its acquisition or
development of nuclear weapons is supposedly "unthinkable" still. 48 But,
given that the unthinkable has occurred already, why should it not again?
The fact that Japan has not fully acknowledged its past atrocities creates
uncertainty about its true intentions and likely behavior. Whatever route Japan
takes to help allay the concerns of its neighbors and the rest of the world that
it would behave responsibly if rearmed, Japan should fully account and
apologize for the atrocities it committed during World War II, and should
cease officially and tacitly authorizing its whitewashing of history. Even then,
Japan's sincerity may be perceived as a strategic ploy. Regardless, just as a
Americans have begun to feel that Japan should accept more of the burden of maintaining stability in the
world.").
45. Fukuyama, supra note 37.
46. William 0. Beeman, Japan's Hidden Agenda in Iraq, PAC. NEWS SERVICE, July 31, 2003,
http://news.pacificnews.org/news/viewarticle.html?articleid=c873 I dc9d548c8bd7fbe2581 e4963850.
47. Kurlantzick, supra note 9.
48. Brian Bremner, The U.S. vs. China: What About Japan?, Bus. WK., Apr. 10, 2001,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/apr200l/nf20O10410_616.htm.
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first step in recovering from alcoholism is admitting the problem, the first step
in Japan's remilitarization should be to admit its problematic past.

